Ideas from 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals' by Colin McGinn [1983], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Subjective View' by McGinn,Colin [OUP 1983,0-19-824695-1]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Being red simply consists in looking red
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness
Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature
We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception?
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We see objects 'directly' by representing them
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness
Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes
The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant
Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases